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Toward a Theory of Industrial Development and
Vertical Disintegration:




After the invention of the transistor, the semiconductor industry has kept growing at a
rate of about 2030?. Moreover, its production base has extended from the United States to
Japan, Europe, and other Asian economies such as South Korea, Taiwan, and China. One of
the factors of this phenomenon is the progress of vertical disintegration in the semiconductor
industry.
The boundaries of firms have been discussed over many years through the transaction
cost approach. Transaction and coordination costs have played an important role with this.
However, this theory of firms assumes a stable market structure and doesn’t address the
situation when the market structure changes as the industry develops. In this sense, it can be
said that the theory is static.
When discussing a long-term process of industrial development, it is necessary to include
the assumption that the market structure is changed by technological innovation and market
scale. Stigler ?1951? and Baldwin and Clark ?2000? have discussed the progression of verti-
cal disintegration in the long-term process of industrial development.
However, vertical disintegration in industrial development is not commonly recognized.
Moreover, vertical disintegration might not be so advanced depending on the industry, and the
process of vertical disintegration might be different according to the age. Therefore, it is not
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Abstract
The semiconductor industry has accomplished surprising growth, and its production base
has extended from the United States to Japan, Europe, and other Asian economies. One of the
factors of this phenomenon is the progress of vertical disintegration in the semiconductor indus-
try. The boundaries of firms are discussed within a transaction cost framework. However, to
identify the process of long-term vertical disintegration at an industrial level, a dynamic theory
rather than a static theory is necessary.
In this paper, the process of vertical disintegration in the semiconductor industry is ex-
plained, and then a consideration is made of a static theory versus a dynamic theory. A tenta-
tive view of a dynamic theory of vertical disintegration is presented based on the case of
semiconductor industry. Vertical disintegration of the semiconductor industry has strongly been
affected by the frequency of technological innovation, the speed of market expansion, the
degree of competition, the existence of interface, and the amount of the transportation costs.
When vertical disintegration is analyzed, it is necessary to take such factors into consideration.
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easy to construct a dynamic theory of vertical disintegration. This paper contributes to the
development of a dynamic theory of vertical disintegration by theoretically considering verti-
cal disintegration in the semiconductor industry.
The composition of this paper is as follows. First of all, the process of vertical disinte-
gration in the semiconductor industry is explained. Secondly, the ability of a static theory of
vertical disintegration in explaining the process of vertical disintegration in the semiconductor
industry is examined. Thirdly, some views about a dynamic theory of vertical disintegration
are considered. Fourthly, a dynamic theory of vertical disintegration is presented based on the
case of the semiconductor industry.
?. The Process of Vertical Disintegration in the Semiconductor
Industry 1
In the early days of the semiconductor industry, device makers were both processing raw
materials and producing manufacturing equipment. In time, the various processes involved in
semiconductor manufacturing came to be done by firms other than the device maker. In this
section, the progression of vertical disintegration involved with silicon wafers, manufacturing
equipment, assembly and testing processes, electronic design automation ?EDA?, fabless, and
foundries is clarified.
Around 1950, device makers refined germanium of high purity and manufactured the
refinement equipment themselves.2 As silicon replaced germanium, a very advanced chemical
treatment was needed, and other firms began to supply high-purity polysilicon. At first,
device makers manufactured single crystals and wafers occasionally, and after that production
moved completely to silicon manufacturers because of the efficiency of production.
At the beginning, device makers also made the manufacturing equipment. However, the
planar process was developed and special manufacturing equipment was needed, so small-
scale device makers did not have room to develop manufacturing equipment. Therefore, the
number of firms that specialized in the manufacturing equipment began to increase, and the
manufacturing equipment industry of the semiconductor was formed in the 1970’s. Some
major device makers kept making the manufacturing equipment by themselves, but the pro-
portion of device makers that depended on other firms increased due to the speed of techno-
logical innovation and the load of the development cost.3
The device makers in the United States came to do the assembly and testing processes in
developing countries like those in Asia in 1960’s.4 Because the process needed quite a lot of
workers, developing countries where cheap laborer existed were very attractive at that time.5
The device makers in the United States often established subsidiary companies and built a lot
of plants in developing countries. As time went on, outsourcing to firms in developing coun-
tries increased, in part due to the policies of the developing countries.
As device integration proceeded, circuit design took a considerable amount of time and
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1 This section is based on Suenaga ?2007?.
2 At that time, germanium was primarily used as the material for semiconductors.
3 About this paragraph, see Stowsky ?1987; 1989?.
4 At first assembly lines were also built in places such as Mexico and El Salvador, but the production capacity
has been reduced related to the influence of political and social uneasiness. See Brown and Linden ?2005?.
5 The labor cost of the assembly process occupied more than half of the manufacturing cost when the assem-
bly process was done in the United States. Comparing wage levels in 1970 with those of the United States,
Singapore was 1/11, and Hong Kong was 1/10. See U. S. Department of Commerce ?1979?.
the need for design automation tools rose. At first, device makers made such tools, but these
were only able to be used within their companies and the development costs could not be
recouped from selling the tools to other companies. With further increases in device integra-
tion, making the tools became more difficult. Venture companies that specialized in making
EDA appeared at the end of 1970’s, and the EDA industry became independent in the latter
half of 1980’s.6
In 1980’s, the number of fabless companies specializing in the design of devices in-
creased. Various factors are thought to have brought about the appearance of these compa-
nies.7 The division of labor between device design and manufacturing engineering became
possible because the making of complementary metal oxide semiconductors ?CMOS? became
the superior manufacturing process, and the technology of the device manufacturing was
standardized. Moreover, the amount of investment necessary to manufacture devices became
enormous, and new start-up firms were able to enter only in areas other than the manufactur-
ing process. Additionally, the increased demand for application specific integrated circuits
?ASIC? and the increase of EDA firms and intellectual property ?IP? were also factors.
The number of fabless companies increased, allowing pure foundries to be born because
an enormous investment was necessary to manufacture the devices. A particular “silicon
cycle” in the semiconductor industry also existed, and it was technically and financially diffi-
cult for device makers to manufacture everything by themselves. As a result, the number of
companies that outsourced manufacturing to the foundries increased. The foundries were able
to deal with problems in the technological and silicon cycles because the foundries were able
to respond at a wide technological level and produce various devices.8
Data about the degree of vertical disintegration follows. The rate of device makers
producing silicon wafers fell to about 11? in the United States, about 4? in Japan, about 2?
in Europe, and about 2? in other countries in Asia and elsewhere in 1992, and these rates
have further decreased after that. Concerning manufacturing equipment, the tendency to
depend on equipment makers also has become strong. In case of photolithography machines
for which the most advanced technology is needed, a greater part of device makers are procur-
ing the machines from specialist firms. The proportion of fabless chip producer sales in-
creased to 10.9? of world production, and the proportion of manufacturing foundries in the
world reached 25? in 2001. Independent contractors account for 26.7? of the assembly
processes in the world in 2003.9
?. The Static Theory of Vertical Disintegration
According to the static theory of vertical disintegration, whether a firm produces inputs
by itself or procures them from other firms basically depends on the cost. That is, if producing
by itself is cheaper, it will produce, and if production by other firms is cheaper, it will entrust
this to other firms. Through self-production it is also possible to use economies of scale and
scope, reduce the transaction costs, and expand market control. Conversely, motivation to
work efficiently weakens and management costs rise. Milgrom and Roberts ?1992: 556?
describe the conditions under which a firm should outsource to other firms. These conditions
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6 About the history of EDA, see Miwa ?2001? and Hobday ?1991?.
7 See Macher et al. ?1999: 268?, Macher and Mowery ?2004: 331?, and Hobday ?1991?.
8 About foundries, see Sato ?2000?.
9 See Takekoshi ?1994: 24? about silicon wafers, Arensman ?2003? about the fabless, Leachman and
Leachman ?2004: 212? about foundries, and Anonymous ?2004? about assembly processes.
include the following:
the use of standard inputs, the presence of several competing suppliers, economies of
scale in the supply firms that are too large to be duplicated by the buyer, economies of
scope that would force the vertically integrated firm into unrelated businesses, and the
absence of specific investments on the part of either the buyer or the seller.
How is such a view effective when thinking about the vertical disintegration of the
semiconductor industry? As a matter of course, when thinking about cost, it is necessary to
consider not only the immediate circumstances but also the long-term perspective. When a
device maker chooses between internal production versus procurement, it is necessary to
consider which is cheaper from a long-term viewpoint. It is necessary to examine from a
long-term viewpoint whether the act of entrusting other firms with important equipment will
become a disadvantage in negotiations. In a realm where the technological innovation is
active, costs might rise relatively over time if an important technology is controlled by other
firms. Moreover, because device production and manufacturing equipment production are
very closely related in the process of achieving state-of-the-art quality, cooperation between
device makers and equipment makers is indispensable. Therefore, a company entrusting its
equipment to other firms risks having its own technology and know-how flow out.
It is not impossible to convert all such aspects into the cost. However, in the semicon-
ductor industry, technological innovation is vast, competition is active, and demand has ex-
panded rapidly. In this case, it is not easy to forecast long-term cost because the uncertainty
is large. Although economies of scale and scope have become major factors in stimulating
vertical disintegration, factor such as efficiency and management costs were not the major
factors influencing the selection of integration versus disintegration.
Moreover, the situation that Milgrom and Roberts have pointed out does not apply to the
entire semiconductor industry as it was. The inputs used with semiconductors were not stan-
dard at all. Silicon of ultra-high purity was needed, and specialized technology was necessary
for the other raw materials and the chemicals. In addition, the manufacturing equipment and
EDA were very specialized, and the specifications of such products were unique in each
company.
To what extent was the degree of competition between suppliers? The oligopoly is very
advanced under the present situation. The market share of the three highest ranked companies
of silicon wafers and various manufacturing equipment is extremely high. There was no buyer
purchasing the cheapest products from among many suppliers. The supplier could not help
but invest a large sum of money in research and development because the inputs were not
standard and new technology was needed. Technological competition was more important
than price competition.
The economies of scale on the supplier side became a major factor in selecting vertical
integration or vertical disintegration. For a device maker producing both the silicon wafers
and the manufacturing equipment itself, the load of the development cost became heavy.
Therefore, a device maker was not able to shoulder the development cost when limiting it to
use within its company. Moreover, selling manufacturing equipment to a rival was not desir-
able for both the company making the equipment and the rival firm because there was a
possibility of spillover of technological know-how for the equipment maker and the rival
company would have to depend on another company for its technology. As a result, a market
for independent suppliers has developed.
Economies of scope have also played a major role in the process of vertical disintegration
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in the semiconductor industry. Advanced expertise was often needed to resolve technical
bottlenecks when device makers developed new devices. Although device makers were theo-
retically able to develop the needed technology through R & D investment and purchases,
these were often practically impossible under intense competition because of time and un-
avoidable costs. So, firms with special technology that was developed in other industrial
fields often entered a related area of the semiconductor industry. For example, some firms
were able to enter the business of silicon refinement by using their chemical technology, other
firms were able to enter the lithography market by using their lens technology, and still other
firms were able to enter the sputtering market by using their vacuum technology.
In turn, suppliers and buyers also often had a specific investment in each other. A device
maker had to order equipment and special materials from another supplier to resolve techno-
logical bottlenecks. Suppliers often received support for the development costs from device
makers because it was not clear that these special orders could be sold to other buyers.
In the case with the semiconductor industry, the proportion of procurement from other
firms has expanded, though there have been a lot of situations different from the situation that
Milgrom and Roberts described. The static theory of vertical disintegration is also effective
to some degree when considering the process of vertical disintegration in the semiconductor
industry. However, discussing a long-term process of industrial development centering on
cost is futile, and the reason why vertical integration has changed is hardly discussed. Thus,
in the next section a dynamic theory that considers the dynamic process of industrial develop-
ment is discussed.
?. The Dynamic Theory of Vertical Disintegration
Though the static theory concerning vertical disintegration was examined in the forego-
ing section, there is some research that discusses vertical disintegration with the assumption
of a dynamic process. The three research papers are taken up in this section. The pioneering
research of Stigler ?1951? paid attention to the relation between the life cycle and vertical
disintegration of an industry. The second paper is a research by Langlois ?2003? and dis-
cussed the relationship between the development of institutions and the vertical disintegration
of an industry. The third is a research on the computer industry by Baldwin and Clark ?2000?
that paid attention to the relationship between modulation and vertical disintegration.
Stigler ?1951? described the relationship between the developmental stage of an industry
and the tendency toward vertical disintegration of that industry. Generally, vertical integration
is predominant in an early stage of an industry, and vertical disintegration advances when it
enters a stage of growth. The tendency toward vertical integration is brought about again
when the industry enters a stage of decline.
A new industry is often outside the norm for an existing economic system and the needed
raw materials are often uncommon, so a firm in the new industry has no choice other than to
choose self-production. Moreover, special manufacturing equipment might be necessary,
along with its design and production. Even more, the necessity to look for skilled workers
who are well-versed in special tasks might arise. It is often necessary to solve technical
problems when a product is being used and to persuade users to switch to the new product
from older ones. However, it is also difficult to find agencies to take charge of such persua-
sion work.
As this new industry reaches a steady state and its prospects are clear, other firms enter
with their specific businesses. Various companies individually focus their business practices,
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and vertical disintegration of the industry advances. For example, some firms specialize in the
production of special raw materials and manufacturing equipment, other firms specialize in
marketing and agency, and some other firms specialize in worker training.
Thereafter, when this industry decline, companies that have played a supplementary role
will begin to decrease. When independent firms go under, the firms that remain will have to
carry out the business.
Langlois ?2003? presented the hypothesis of the “vanishing hand” as opposed to the
hypotheses of the “invisible hand” ?Smith, 1976? and the “visible hand” ?Chandler, 1977?.
According to Langlois, Smith thought that the division of labor was advanced by the invisible
hand of the market as market expanded, though Chandler thought that the visible hand took
the place of the invisible hand. However, Langlois pointed out that the view of Chandler was
only valid for a specific historical environment.
The “vanishing hand” hypothesis of Langlois is as follows. As the population and their
incomes increase and the barriers of exchange decrease, the division of labor that Smith
indicated progresses. Each role becomes more specialized, and coordination through the
market increases. However, the speed is various at which the technology, organizations, and
institutions that form the basis of this process are changed. The “management revolution” that
Chandler described is a result of this unbalance. That is, although technology with high
productivity makes for the necessity of new coordination, the unbalance increases when the
development of the market and institutions that fill such a necessity is delayed. This unbal-
ance causes the “management revolution” that Chandler described. However, as the market
expands and the institutions that support exchange develop, centralized management of the
process of production decreases gradually, and vertical disintegration advances again.
Baldwin and Clark ?2000? discussed the process of vertical disintegration of the com-
puter industry while paying attention to the concept of modulation. In their view, the modules
are units in a larger system that are structurally independent of one another, but work together
?Baldwin and Clark, 2000: 63?. The first type of computer to appear as a true module type
computer is system/360 of IBM launched in 1964. Before then, computer products were
incompatible with each other. If customers wanted to change the systems they had, they could
not help but completely rewrite the application software and buy new peripherals. To main-
tain compatibility between products, IBM adopted the module design, and the series was great
success in the computer market.
It was the quality of the architecture and the establishment of the design rules that made
it important to work in this mode of modulation. Because the parameters had been clarified
enough, the developer of each module was free to make the effort to improve the functioning
of that module.
However, firms that manufactured modules compatible with IBM products appeared, and
they made the products highly competitive by specializing in specific areas. The industry was
changed from a substantial monopoly by IBM to a huge module cluster. As printers, termi-
nals, memory, software, and CPUs came to be produced by special firms, the position of IBM
has decreased.
?. A Dynamic Theory of Vertical Disintegration Based on
the Case of the Semiconductor Industry
When technological innovation, especially radical innovation, frequently develops, it is
very difficult for a company to judge whether to take charge of the specific input and produc-
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tion process by itself or to entrust it to other firms. The cost might be able to be reduced for
the short term when entrusting it to other firms. However, costs might increase due to the
market control of other firms over the long term. In the realm where technological innovation
frequently occurs, it might be difficult to enter the target area again later. Although the
suppliers in the semiconductor industry might have been competing at first, a small number
of firms came to occupy a high market-share in some realms with the passage of time.
Therefore, in order to analyze the dynamic processes of an industry like the semiconduc-
tor industry, a dynamic theory is more useful than a static theory. The frequency of techno-
logical innovation, the speed of market expansion, the degree of competition, the existence of
the interface and the height of the transportation cost are factors that have influenced vertical
disintegration in the semiconductor industry.
Although the semiconductor appeared to be taking the place of the vacuum tube origi-
nally, it had the potential to exceed the performance of the vacuum tube greatly. As the
semiconductor came to be manufactured at a low cost, the market expanded rapidly. The
market expanded not only to radio and television but also to calculators, computers, personal
computers, cellular phones, and cars. Moreover, semiconductor technology was a new tech-
nology using the solid state of semiconductors, and it had significant potential. As a result,
new technological innovations arose one after another. These technological innovations
brought about the decline of the price and extended the market, and this brought further
technological innovation. Thus, the virtuous circle of technological innovation and demand
has greatly developed the semiconductor industry.
Under such a situation, the anti-trust policy of the United States enabled small-scale firms
to enter the market, and active competition was brought about. The existence of venture
capital and vigorousness of independent spirit also had a big influence. Moreover, high profits
and big markets came to cause intense competition and press not only the United States but
also Europe, Japan and Asia.
The speed of technological innovation and market extension was fast and competition
was active, so it was difficult for device makers to produce everything by themselves. There-
fore, device makers could not help but depend on other firms even if it was understood that
their position in the market might weaken.
Whether the interface between the processes became easily clear and whether the trans-
portation costs were relatively cheap were factors influencing vertical disintegration. The
existence of interface and the cheapness of transportation cost pressed vertical disintegration
in the semiconductor industry. However, the semiconductor industry was a different from the
computer industry, and vertical disintegration in the semiconductor industry did not advance
under a clear architecture, and it progressed under the path dependence.
Although at first the interfaces among device production, silicon refinement, manufactur-
ing equipment, and EDA were not clear, the interfaces became clear with competitiveness
among the various firms and the promotion of standardization by industry associations. The
fact that the interface between device design and manufacturing processes became clear was
a great factor for the birth of the fabless and the foundries. Moreover, the assembly and
testing process was easily separated at first. Thus, the entry of new firms became technically
and financially possible due to the clarification of the interfaces. As the entry of such firms
pressed for further clarification of the interface, vertical disintegration then progressed further.
Langlois ?2003? pointed out that the management revolution was brought about because
the market and its institutions were underdeveloped. Nonetheless, the existence of the inter-
face and the problem of the transportation cost are important. In heavy industries like the steel
industry and chemical industry, it was originally undesirable to divide the processes, and the
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corporate scale could not help but grow. On the other hand, because the semiconductor and
the computer are both lightweight, it was not comparatively difficult to complete portions of
the work in different places ?or among different corporations? considering the transportation
costs.
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